German reunification through cartoons

As I read Belinda Cartens-Wickham's Gender in Cartoons of German Unification article, I wondered if rapid reunification was indeed the best course of action in 1990. As I see it, there were three options on the table that the East and West German politicians could have chosen from.
Option #1- rapid reunification
This option was seen by many Germans, including West Germany chancellor Kohl as inevitable. Kohl's "popularity stood at 31 percent" at the end of 1989, so it made political sense for him to push for a quick reunification (marriage between East and West Germany) to cement himself in the pages of history and hopefully bolster his poor approval ratings too. This leads to the many cartoons like figure 3, which show the FRG as Chancellor Kohl, a groom being held back by several foreign leaders from his bride, the passive and meek woman- the DDR. This option leads to several problems, specifically the economic issues. Do we have both states with the same currency? This leads to what was discussed in class as "two uneasy partners" and made life more difficult for East Germans because they had to suddenly pay for gas, food, rent, and other items they had not been paying for under the soviet regime before. What ends up happening in this option is that the West is seen as the groom- powerful, decision maker while East Germany is viewed as the passive, inferior, whorish partner almost holding West Germany down like an anchor economically.
Option #2- Two independent States
If there had been no reunification, then perhaps West Germany would have become an independent nation-state, and so would have East Germany. Much like North and South Korea, I believe that West Germany would have become even more economically superior to East Germany over the next nineteen years, perhaps even one of the big European powers at the turn of the century. Because of East Germany's failing economic situation, there is little doubt that East Germany would have eventually succumbed to a dictatorship or remained a very centralized, government controlled nation, but would have had a trading suitor in WG for imports and exports that EG needed to buy and sell. This probably would have been the least positive outcome for EG and possibly the best one for WG.
Option #3- gradual reunification
Instead of having a unpleasant situation like in fig 11, where Chancellor Kohl is walking down the aisle with his bride, her vail being held down by a vault, and tacks in their path, East and West Germany could have reunited over the course of a few years. This would have allowed for gradual economic transition of currency, more bilateral decision making on the part of East and West German politicians, and less social unrest for the East and West Germans, especially women who would have had more time to find a new job or at least have a date in mind when they knew their job would be taken from them, so they could plan accordingly. Gradual change would have also helped remove the "Ostalgie," or nostalgia for the good ole days East Germans felt towards the years prior to reunification. Gradual reunification would have probably been better economically, politically, and socially for Germans, but option #1 was chosen, and we see today what ultimately came about because of that choice.

Anti-Fraternization: What a Mess!!!

As class was about to end on Friday, the question was asked why does any of this matter? So what if all this stuff was going on in a post-war, post-Nazi Germnay split in in two and occupied by the victorious Allies? I think that there are two important keys to keep in mind as a direct result of the anti-fraternization movement during that crucial time in German history.
1) Humanizes this entire conflict- German men are returning home, downtrodden, disillusioned, and defeated only to find that "home" is not much better than the front lines, if at all. Millions to men are dead, leaving a surplus of single and widowed women who needed protection and true love to help get through these awful times in their destroyed
cities and villages throughout Germany, east and west. The women have become more aggressive, as a result of the war (I guess they had to become that way because they had no one to rely upon, no one to shield them from the horrors of war and the advancing enemy forces). This is all just a difficult, precarious position to be in if you were a German living after WW2. I feel compassion for what the men and women had to endure; even if they were still Nazis, they were our fellow human beings, and no one should have to live through what they had to endure.
2) This gives us a better understanding of what it was like on the ground for the Germans during this era. If you're a man, your women are hanging out and even sleeping with the "better looking" Americans or worse yet possibly being raped by the Soviet soldiers as "war prizes." That has to be extremely frustrating. Are the women who do these things traitors then? I think that little poem sums it up best when it said "He lies in a unmarked grave, she in a strange bed. He fell for the Fatherland, she for cigarettes." I do not know what i would have done if I was a returning German man... what could i do? The options look even more destitute if I was a German woman after the war. But overall I am glad I read this article because it revealed information and ideas I had not known or considered previously, and it changed my view of Germany and Germans
so that I feel compassion for them and what they had to go through. Before today I did not feel that way, and I suppose that is why this topic matters; knowledge is power, and because of this article, I feel empowered and more knowledgeable about German history as a whole.

"The Hitler Myth"

What I have found interesting is this idea argued by Ian Kershaw in "the Hitler Myth" in Nazism and German Society 1933-45 that this myth was different for the four different social groups in Germany at the time. Kershaw argues that the in this myth, Hitler
1) personified national community
2) bulwark against Marxism
3) sought to reassert Germany's "true" status in the world
4) military leader
5) great statesman
6) moderate
7) brought economic success

What is interesting here is that the myth itself was seen and used differently among the 4 different German groups within society. The elites determined that the myth was politically useful, and (incorrectly) judged that Hitler was a moderate, rather than the rest of the Nazi rabble which tended to be more radical. They felt as though they could work with him, and could possibly use him and his popularity to further themselves and their own agendas down the road. The Socialists, communists, and catholics, people who were not part of the "national community," were especially against myth #1, that Hitler personified the German national community, and to an extent myth #2, that Hitler was a bulwark against Marxism. When they saw Hitler, they believed that this man might just take everything away from them, maybe even their own lives. So they, in response to the myth, also became more radical, as the threat of Nazism grew more menacing. The non-organized masses, those who were on the sidelines but not in the game, saw in Hitler a man who would take them, and their beloved country of Germany somewhere- this idea of moving forward. With each political, economic, and military success, they believed this myth even more, thus enlarging the myth to the point that it was self-sustaining and became even bigger than Hitler himself. For the members of the Nazi party itself, Hitler's power base, this myth further entrenched them into this notion that Hitler was the man. With no cynicism, the Nazi party members honestly believed that this list of attributes concerning Hitler were absolutely true 100%. Regardless whether the 7 aspects of the Hitler myth were true of not, these 4 social groups within Germany were affected by the myth, thus increasing the myth's power, until eventually it was a crucial part of life within the Nazi State.

The Turnip Winter of 1916-17

I cannot imagine a worse, more depressing situation than to be an average german on the homefront during the Turnip winter of 1916-17. As the police reports indicate, the people where between a rock and a hard place. "The mood can only be described as very bad...the discontent in the population has reached a new intensity...the attitude of women toward the war can be summarized as 'Peace at any price.' (66)" First the government rations the bread, and provides potatoes instead. Then, potatoes by 1916 become increasingly difficult to find legally, so the only alternative become turnips. As Fritzsche points out on pg 69, over 28,000 copies of "Turnips Instead of Potatoes" were published in newspapers and cookbooks during this awful time in German history. I have never eaten just turnips, or turnip soup, but if that was all I could eat, for months at a time, without meat, bread, potatoes, or hardly any sugar or chocolate to consume either, I could not be a happy camper- to say the least. On top of the terrible eating situation, Fritsche continues by adding that "the winter turned out to be the coldest in memory...35,000 households in Nuremberg simply ran out of coal before the winter ended... 175,000 men and women died of influenza in the year 1918." I just canot fathom a worse living quagmire than to not only be able to eat hardly anything, not be able to keep yourself warm, and to sit back and read daily reports of how the war was not going germany's way any longer. This shows how devoted the people were to not only the war, but to their country, and for that these poor souls should be recognized for enduring one of, if not the worst living conditions possible in all of german history. There is just no way I could have been able to survive through that horrible turnip winter.

The Blame Game

Like many other fans of Bulldawg Nation, I really liked our chances going into last year's football season. We had so many things seemingly going in our favor; good offense, solid coaching staff, and the media "experts" ranking us @ #1 in the preseason rankings. I must say I bought into the hype... looking back I must admit I believed it too much. When I saw the cover of Sports Illustrated for example, I decieved myself and chose to buy into what "society" was selling. Well, the "experts" were very wrong. We ended up a very less than stellar 10-3 team that had way too many defects. Who's to blame for last year? The players? I do not think so. The Coaches? Probably not. I believe that the fan base, who too eagerly bought into the hoopla, was to blame. In this same way, the German people bought into the hype of German conquest and annexationism, which in turn fueled this German drive to fight a war with (nearly all of)Europe, ultimately an unsuccessful one in the end. Just like last season's UGA Football team the same question arises: Who is to blame? In the article "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," David Kaiser blames Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and his eagerness to buy into the hype of expansionism for the glory of Germany. I disagree with Kaiser. I believe that the blame for Germany's entry into WWI and subsequent failures falls onto the shoulders of "Society" and to an extent Bismarck's fault as well. Whether it was King Wilhelm II or it was the paper boy on the street-corner, nearly every single individual in Germany bought into this idea that they had to fight an upcoming war against their European foes. This misplaced sentiment was then what the Chancellor unwittingly drew upon to make decisions; he bought into the hype too. In the end however, part of the blame also falls on Bismarck because he created a system of governance that was far too complicated and difficult to manage for those who came after him to handle. If he had made a less rigorous form of goverment for Germany, perhaps domestic and political tensions would have been able to be corrected, thus not creating a false belief that a European conflict was unavoidable sometime in the near future. Perhaps like those German soldiers who sorrowfully trodded home after their WWI defeat, dawg fans have no one to blame but themselves for setting the bar too high and then having to deal with the bitter thought of what might have been.

the instabilities of the Wilhemine "society"

I think the 2 biggest reasons why this particular time in German history was so unstable was because of the conflict between modernity and the past and the fact that this society was increasingly divided. When one sees the economic unrest, as Jennifer said in class, "the face of capitalism was changing." This economic shift, thanks to the 1st and 2nd industrial revolutions, had transferred most of the economy from the villages (agrarian) to the cities (modernity). Even today, while kids talk about I-phones and technology, the older generation talks of how things used to be back "in the good ole days." These exists this un-noticed tension between progress and tradition: the future and the past. There were tons of people throughout Germnay that did not like this "progress" and wanted things to go back to the way it used to be. Increasingly, more and more people were afraid of this "mass" culture developing in Germany. This development was scary; was this an unfortunate consequence of progress? This idea leads into another trend; the country was increasingly divided. National minorities were seen as forces for disintegration and threating to a unified Germany in the minds of many germans. Jews were increasingly becoming scapegoats 4 the country's problems. Because Catholics formed their own communities, many saw them as separate from the rest of German society, and thus a threat. The SPD, conservatives, and Liberals also helped dis-unify the country, further adding to the instability of this time period. On the whole, Wilhemine society was unstable, unfriendly, and disunified.

A mixed bag of German history

I see the complex political scene within pre-Nazi Germany as a very fluid, interesting situation. As Chris Lorenz accurately points out in his work Beyond Good and Evil? The German Empire of 1871 and Modern German Historiography, this time in German history was "abnormal history without a half-life...[the past that won't pass]." To an extent each theory, whether it was the Bielefeld, Mittellage, Mommsen, Ritter, or Nipperdey schools of thought, each in my view, added (and still add) some badly needed light onto a very mirky, confusing topic. I believe that each person had at least 1 idea that helped bring us, those who look back on this particular time in German history, a little closer to discovering why Germany ultimately bought into the appeal and sway of the Nazis. The Bielefeld interpretation argues that Germany's modern economy combined with a feudal, aristocratic political system, tragically led to the rise of Nazism in Germany. The weakness of the Liberals, whether they were "traitors" to their own cause of just got dealt a poor political hand (coupled with poor timing) also probably led to the establishment of the 3rd Reich as well. I agree with the Mittellage theory that argues that the poor geopolitical position of Germany, even though Bismarck was a good statesman, contributed to the eventual descent down the dark path to Nazism too. Agreeing with Mommsen, Liberals did have a huge problem on their hands when it became evident that they lacked appeal to the masses b/c they had nothing to offer them (and possibly because the Libs were also scared of the masses gaining too much power). I agree with Gehard Ritter in that the social structure, which did pre-date Germany itself, factored into the equation. And when it comes to Nipperdey, I believe that he is correct in saying that Germany's unique glorification of the military compared to other European countries, helped lead the country down the road toward national socialism. If one takes a piece of each argument and pieces them all together, I think all of these issues working together unbeknowst to the actors on the stage at the time ultimately led Germany toward a political climate where a man like Hitler could bubble to the top and effectively assume control of the country.